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Few  agricultural  systems  are  so  closely
intertwined and mutually dependent  as those
of the United States and Mexico.  But despite
our  dependencies  - or  possibly  because  of
them  - our bilateral  trade  relationship  has
been  one  of frequent  discord.
Too  often  in  the  past,  each  country  has
operated independently  in its own self inter-
est,  oblivious  to the importance  of our  $2.2
billion  in  two-way  agricultural  trade to  each
partner and with little concern for the impact
of  its  policies  and  actions  on  the  other.
However,  the  growing  interdependence  of
our  agricultural  economies  makes  closer
cooperation  necessary,  if not  inevitable.
The  supply/purchase  agreement  signed
this past January  between the United  States
and  Mexico  hopefully  marks  a turn  towards
greater  cooperation  in our  agricultural  rela-
tionships.  This  agreement  is  important  be-
cause  it  guarantees  Mexico  the  right  to
purchase specified quantities of basic agricul-
tural commodities  in the United  States.  This
represents  a significant  change in  U.S.  poli-
cy.  None of our other trading partners enjoys
similar  supply  access  guarantees.  However,
while this is undoubtedly important,  the true
significance  of the  agreement  lies  not in the
guarantees  it provides  to  Mexico,  nor in the
increased sales it means for U.S.  agricultural
exporters  in  the  current  year,  but  what  it
portends for  U.S.-Mexican  agricultural trade
relationships  in  the  future.  If the  govern-
ments  of the  United  States  and  Mexico  can
bring  the  same  cooperative  spirit  demon-
strated  in the  agreement  to bear  on some of
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the  other  problems  confronting  our  two
countries,  we  will  have  achieved  a  sound
basis  for  the  satisfactory  resolution  of some
long-standing  differences.
The  Agreement
The  first  step  toward  the  January
agreement  was actually  taken last November
when the  Mexican  Government signed  con-
tracts  with a number  of producers  in  Michi-
gan,  New York,  and California for the supply
of  177,000  metric  tons  of  dried  beans  to
Mexico in  1980.  This was  significant for both
countries  as  well  as  unprecedented.  On  the
one hand,  it was the first  time  Mexico - or
any  other  country,  for  that  matter  - con-
tracted directly with U.S.  producers to  grow
and supply a specific product for export.  For
the  United  States  this  quantity  - repre-
senting  roughly  one-fifth  of U.S.  bean  pro-
duction  last  year - was  the  largest  export
sale  of beans  ever  arranged.
The success of this effort, plus the converg-
ence of several special circumstances,  fueled
the desire  for both countries  to enter  into a
more comprehensive  agricultural  pact at the
start  of  the  year.  Among  these  special  cir-
cumstances  were:
- the serious  shortfall in Mexican  agricul-
tural production  in  1979 - especially  of the
country's  dietary  mainsays,  corn  and  beans
- as a result of prolonged drought and early
frosts.  The  drought  has  continued  with  in-
creasing  intensity  in  1980.
- the strain on the Mexican transportation
system brought on by the sheer magnitude of
Mexico's  import  requirements;
-the  expectation  that  growth  in  the
demand  for  food  in  Mexico  stemming  from
population  and  income  growth  would  con-
tinue  to outstrip  domestic production  in the
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short  run;
- the availability of large  supplies of U.S.
grains  and  oilseeds  resulting  from  the  sus-
pension  of exports  to the  Soviet  Union;  and
-the  desire  of  both  governments  to
strengthen  our  bilateral  ties  while  at  the
same time satisfying important needs on both
sides  of the  border.
Under the agreement,  the Government of
Mexico  will buy about 9  million metric tons
of  food  this  year  from  the  United  States.
Most of this will be obtained by CONASUPO
(the  Government  purchasing  agency)  in the
open  market  through  a tender  process.  The
U.S.  Department of Agriculture is helping to
facilitate  the process  by providing  assistance
to  CONASUPO  in  development  of specific
tenders,  publicizing tender announcements,
and providing facilities in the Department for
the  awarding  of contracts.
The  agreement  provides  that  the  United
States  will  guarantee  Mexico  access  to  the
U.S.  market to  purchase  up to the  specified
quantities.  What  this  really  means  is  that
Mexican buyers of agricultural products have
the same  rights  in the  U.S.  market  as  U.S.
purchasers  of  those  same  products.  In  the
event  supplies  are  not  available  through
normal  commercial  channels,  the  United
States  will  use  the  "full  scope  of the  legal
authority"  of the Commodity  Credit  Corpo-
ration  to  assist  Mexico  in  acquiring  the
agreed-upon  commodities.
In view  of the success  achieved  under the
agreement  this  year and  the likelihood  that
Mexico's  food import  needs will continue  to
grow  in  the  short  term,  negotiations  to
extend  the  agreement  are  expected  to  take
place  in  the  near  future.
Mexico's  Agricultural
Sector  and  Policies
The U.S.-Mexican  supply agreement com-
plements moves initiated  in Mexico  last year
towards  more  open  trade  in  agricultural
products.  Needless to  say,  the United  States
wholeheartedly  endorses  this  new  direction
in policy.
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In  the  past,  Mexico  has  been  extremely
reluctant to allow more  imports, fearing  that
such  action  would  be  seen  as  a  failure  of
Government  efforts  to  achieve  self-
sufficiency  in production  of major food prod-
ucts.  This reflects  the  political  sensitivity  of
the  agricultural sector in Mexico  - a sector
which  has  been  characterized  as  both  the
cause  and  the  potential cure  of some of the
country's  major  social  and economic difficul-
ties.  It also reflects  the inescapable fact  that
self-sufficiency  in  food  production  still  re-
mains  a  goal  in  1980,  not  a  reality.
Agriculture's  contribution  to  Mexico's
gross  domestic  product  has  been  declining
steadily  over the  past two decades.  In  1979,
it accounted  for  only about 8  percent of the
total,  down  from  about  11  percent  in  1970.
More  importantly,  agricultural  production
has  been  unable  to keep  pace  with  popula-
tion growth over  the last  10 years  (Table  1).
Rural incomes are still less than one-fifth as
large  as  those  in  urban  areas  - $420  per
capita versus  $2,700 in 1979.  The poor earn-
ings  prospects  in  rural  areas  continue  to
encourage  migration to the cities and emigra-
tion to the United States.  And as the agricul-
tural  base  gets  smaller,  the  difficulty  of
achieving  government  production  goals  in-
creases.  Decreased production  means higher
food  prices  in  the  cities,  fueling  inflation
(Table  2).
The  problem  of  Mexican  agriculture  is
extremely  complex.  Part  of the  problem  is
the existence of very real physical limitations
on  agricultural  production  in  Mexico.  Only
about one-fifth of the total land area is arable
- and much  of this is  totally dependent  on
adequate  rainfall.  Part of the problem is that
Mexico's  agricultural  planners  have found  it
difficult to strike a workable balance between
the desire to increase agricultural  production
and exports on the one hand, and the need to
improve the living conditions of the majority
of the  rural  population  on  the  other.
The major investments  in agriculture  dur-
ing the past 25 years have been in irrigation.
Roughly 25 percent of Mexico's  croplands are
now  irrigated  - and  productivity  in  these
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TABLE  1. Contribution  of Agriculture to  Mexico's Gross  Domestic  Product1
Total  Share  Share  from
From  Agriculture  Crops  Livestock
Percent  Percent
1960  15  10  5
1970  11  7  4
1979  preliminary  8  5  3
1Does  not  include  forestry  and  fishing
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.
TABLE  2.  Growth  in  Mexican  Agricultural  Production
Period  Crops  Livestock  Total
----Percent----
1960-68  5.5  2.5  4.6
1968-78  1.9  5.3  2.8
1972-78  2.9  3.4  3.0
1960-78  3.5  4.1  3.6
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.
areas has gone  up markedly.  However,  limi-
tations  on  water  and  on  land  suitable  for
irrigation make it unlikely that new irrigation
projects can contribute  significantly to future
increases  in  productivity.  Far and  away  the
bulk of the rural poor are involved in dryland
farming or tropical agriculture - areas which
haven't received nearly as  much government
attention  and  assistance.
Part  of the  problem  can  be  found  in the
agrarian  structure  of the  country  where the
land tenure  system  aids  in the  achievement
of the  country's  social  objectives  at  the  ex-
pense  of gains  in  agricultural  productivity.
The  basic  farming  unit  in  Mexico  is  the
ejido - in  which  the  land  is  owned  by the
Mexican Government but distributed to indi-
vidual communities  which,  in  turn,  parcel it
out to individual producers for their and their
descendents'  use as long as they actively farm
it.
Ejidos represent nearly 70 percent of Mex-
ico's  total  farming  units.  But  despite  their
numerical  superiority,  they account for only
about  half the  value  of the  country's  crops
and  only  a  fourth  of the  value  of  livestock
production.
Their  productivity  is  comparatively  low
when  contrasted  against  that  of  Mexico's
small  privately  owned  farms.  Farms  of less
than  5  hectares  represent  less than  20  per-
cent of total farm  units.  Their average  size  is
much  less  than that  of the  ejidos,  but  they
still  manage  to  account  for  4  percent  of
Mexico's  crop  production  and  a very  signifi-
cant  20  percent  of  the  value  of  livestock
production.
The  largest  farm  units,  privately  owned
operations of more than 5 hectares,  represent
only  12  percent  of  Mexico's  farms  but  ac-
count for 45 percent of the crop value and 54
percent  of the  livestock  value  (Table  3).
The contribution  of private  farms  to  Mex-
ico's  food  needs  is  also  handicapped  by  the
strict legal limitations  on the amount of land
which  can  be  owned  and  farmed.  Present
Mexican  law  does  not  allow  producers  to
combine  crop  and  livestock  production.
Thus,  if  they  produce  livestock,  they  can't
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TABLE  3.  Mexico's  Farm  Size  and  Structure
Value  of Production
Average  Arable
Type  Number  Size  Land  Per  Unit  Crops  Livestock
Thous.  Hectares  Hectares  --Percent  of  Total--
Ejidos  2,182  32.0  5.8  51  26
Private  Farms:
Smaller than
5 hectares  609  1.5  1.2  4  20
Larger  than
5 hectares  388  178.3  24.9  45  54
Total  3,179  44.0  7.3  100  100
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.
grow  any of the  necessary feed  crops.  Or,  if
they grow  corn or  soybeans,  they can't  raise
pigs  as  a  sideline.
The  Drive  for  Self-Sufficiency
In March of this year the Mexican  Govern-
ment announced  a new agricultural  program
known  as  SAM  (Sistema  Alimentario  Mex-
icano),  which  departs  in  several  significant
ways  from  earlier  programs.
SAM's  stated  goal  is for  Mexico's  agricul-
tural producers  to  achieve  self-sufficiency  in
corn and edible beans  by 1982,  and in other
basic  commodities  by  1985.  This  contrasts
with earlier  initiatives  which  focused  mainly
on  the  export  sector.
However,  a key  feature of the program  is
the  emphasis  on improving  the  income  and
welfare  of farm  families  through  greater  at-
tention to dryland and tropical agriculture
not just  irrigated  agriculture.
The central  elements  in  the new  program
are  higher  support  prices  for  basic  grains,
lower prices for inputs, and greater availabili-
ty  of credit  and  crop  insurance:
- The 1980/81  guaranteed prices for corn,
wheat,  and sorghum are being raised 28,  18,
and 24 percent, respectively,  over their year-
earlier  levels.
-Crop  area  will  be  expanded  by  1.8
million hectares,  of which  nearly  one-fourth
will  be  irrigated.
- Credit availability  to  farmers  has been
raised by roughly a third over last year's level
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and  will  be  accompanied  by  preferential
interest  rates.
- The prices farmers pay for fertilizer and
insecticides have  been cut 30 percent,  while
crop  insurance  premium  rates  have  been
lowered  3  percent.
- The prices of improved varieties of corn
and bean seeds have been cut by 75 percent
and  larger  availabilities  of  these  seeds  also
are  expected.
Although the SAM program recognizes the
need  for  a  close  link  between  consumer
subsidies  and  producer  prices,  the  govern-
ment's fixed bread and tortilla prices will not
be  raised  this  year  despite  the  increases  in
grower prices  of wheat and corn.  This means
that  demand  for  these  products,  which  are
already  in  deficit,  will  remain  strong.
Continued  Need  for  Imports
SAM  is  an  ambitious  program  - but
whether it can conquer the many constraints
affecting  agricultural  production  remains  to
be seen. While Mexico  does indeed have the
labor and now,  thanks to its oil revenues, the
capital to achieve sizable  production  gains in
the  next  few  years,  its  land  tenure  system
may not be conducive  to the kind of agricul-
tural  structure  necessary  for  achieving  self-
sufficiency.  Also,  the lands  that are not  now
in production  tend to be marginal for agricul-
tural purposes  - the terrain  is  uneven,  the
rainfall  erratic,  the  soils  poor.  Tremendous
investments  will  have  to  be  made  to  bring
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these  lands  into  production  and  to provide
them  with  necessary  infrastructure.  Finally,
there  is  the perversity  of Mother Nature  to
overcome.
It  is  therefore  likely  that  Mexico  will
continue  to have  significant  import require-
ments  in  the  short  term.  Over  the  longer
term,-the  need  for  imports  will  be  deter-
mined  by  the  success  of  SAM  on  the  one
hand  versus  population  and income-created
demand  on the  other.
The  potential  pressures  on  the  demand
side  are  great.  Mexico's  per  capita  caloric
consumption  is only three-fourths  as  high as
that in the  United  States.  And of that total,
roughly half the  Mexican calories  come from
cereals, versus only 20 percent in the United
States.
As  gains  in  agricultural  production  help
improve incomes in rural areas, assuming the
SAM  is  successful,  they  will  also  create  a
desire for more  food and a greater variety  of
food products, judging from what's happened
in other countries as  they develop.  This  will
be  magnified  substantially  as  Mexico's  new
oil wealth filters  through the economy (Table
4).
With  a population  growing  at  an  average
annual rate  of roughly  3 percent,  a projected
8-percent  economic  growth  rate  over  the
next decade,  and the  continuing  pressure  of
rural-to-urban  migration,  the  demand  for  a
wider variety  of food products  - especially
protein  products  - will  increase.  Mexico
will  have  little  alternative,  at  least  in  the
short run, but to import  larger quantities  of
grain and oilseeds.  This has important impli-
cations  for  U.S.  farmers  since  a  substantial
share  of these  imports  will  come  from  the
United  States.
Mexico's  Agricultural
Trade  and Trade Policies
Mexico  is already a billion-dollar  customer
for  U.S.  farm  products,  making  it our ninth
largest  market.  Most  of  our  sales  last  year
consisted of bulk commodities,  such as corn,
wheat  and wheat  flour,  sorghum,  and  soy-
beans.
The  United  States,  in  turn,  is  Mexico's
largest agricultural customer,  with imports of
agricultural  products  totaling $1.2  billion  in
fiscal  1979.  These  consisted  primarily  of
TABLE  4.  Factors  Influencing  Mexico's  Demand  for Agricultural Products
Total  Rural  Urban
Population
No.  (Million)  68.3  28.7  39.6
Share  of  Total  (Percent)  100  42  58
Rate  of Growth  (Percent)  3.1  1.5  4.8





Outlook  Next 3-5  Yrs.  6.5-8.5





Jan.-May  1980  63
Source:  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture.
213
StarkeyWestern Journal of Agricultural Economics
coffee  and  horticultural  products  - winter
fruits  and  vegetables.
Mexico's  agricultural  trade  policies  are
primarily  a reflection  of the country's  efforts
to  become  self-sufficient  in  production  of
basic commodities.  Both imports and exports
are  tightly  controlled.
Essentially  all  agricultural  imports  into
Mexico  require  licenses,  which  usually  are
not granted for products which compete with
those produced locally,  or for which Mexican
goods  can  be  substituted.  Foodstuffs  con-
sidered  luxury  items,  which  include  many
canned goods,  also are frequently refused the
necessary  licenses.
Mexico  is  one  of the  few countries  in the
world which  uses an official  price  system for
duty  valuation.  Official  prices,  which  often
have  little  relation  to  actual  market  values,
serve  as  the basis  for calculating  ad  valorem
duties  on  many  products,  escalating  the
protective  impact  of  Mexico's  already  high
tariffs.
In  the basic  agricultural  commodity areas,
the  Government  supply  agency,  CON-
ASUPO,  until  very  recently  had  exclusive
authority  over  imports  and  exports  of  such
basic foods  as  grains,  fats and oils,  and dairy
products.  It permitted  imports only when  it
determined  that  domestic  supplies  were
short.  These  determinations  frequently
underestimated  demand  for  these  products
by user  industries  and  may  have  artificially
constrained  the  development  of  domestic
meat production.  This  is particularly  true in
the  case  of the poultry  and pork  industries.
CONASUPO  also  set  the  price  at  which
imports  could  be sold  on the  domestic  mar-
ket  in  order  to  protect  domestic  farmers.
Since  these  prices  were  generally  above
world  market levels,  a further  dampening  of
import  demand  occurred.
On the export side, the Government exer-
cises strict controls  to make  sure that domes-
tic consumption requirements  are met before
products  are  sold  abroad.  As  an  example  of
this  policy,  the  Government  imposed  an
embargo on exports  of beef and live animals
last year in an effort to increase domestic beef
supplies  in  the  Mexican  market.  Shortages
had  driven  prices  up  to a  politically  unten-
able  level.
Unfortunately  this action  did  not  succeed
in  its  immediate  objectives  because  of  the
inability  to  redirect  meat  on  short  notice
from  the  producing  areas  of the  country  to
the  deficit  urban  areas  of  Mexico.  At  the
same time,  by forcing cattlemen  to sell at the
lower  internal  price  (rather  than  export),  it
may have also provided  a disincentive  to the
long-term development of beef production in
Mexico.  Whereas  the  ban  on  livestock  ex-
ports was lifted during 1979,  the ban on meat
exports  essentially  remains  in  effect.
Move  Toward  Trade Liberalization
Despite  these  controls,  Mexico's  trade
policy is  moving gradually  away from protec-
tionism  and toward  more  open  trade  under
the  Lopez  Portillo  Government.
An important step in this direction came in
March  of last year,  when  the  Mexican  Gov-
ernment reached agreements with the wheat
milling,  mixed  feed,  and  oilseed  industries
which  significantly  altered  CONASUPO's
import  role.
Committees  have  been  established  by
Mexico's  Ministry  of  Commerce  to  provide
the  framework  for  the  formulation  of  all
import  decisions.  These  committees  consist
of  one  representative  of  the  Ministry  of
Commerce,  one from CONASUPO,  and one
from  the  appropriate  private  trade  associa-
tion. Once import decisions have been made,
CONASUPO  will  purchase  in  the  name  of
and  for  the  account  of  the  private  trade
association.
In the  past,  private  industries  reliant  on
import  decisions  made  solely  by  CON-
ASUPO often complained of inadequate  sup-
plies  and  poor  timing  of purchases  and de-
liveries.  Their  direct  involvement  on  the
committee  that  makes  the  import  decisions
should  alleviate  some  of these supply  prob-
lems and perhaps  increase  imports, although
the final control of imports  continues  to rest
with the  Mexican  Government.
214
December 1980Mexican Agricultural Economy
Another  change  in CONASUPO's  buying
policies  which  may  result  in increased  pur-
chases  from  the  United  States  is  the  aban-
donment of an earlier practice that one-third
of all purchases  would be made on  a govern-
ment-to-government  basis,  one-third
through  public  tenders,  and  one-third
through  other  contractual  arrangements.
Now,  although CONASUPO  still gives  pref-
erence  to government-to-government  trans-
actions, there  is no predetermined limitation
on the use of public tenders,  and purchases
of  this  type  have  been  increasing.  This
should result in increased sales opportunities
for  U.S.  exporters.
CONASUPO  will  continue  to  handle  im-
ports  of  certain  quantities  of  oilseeds  and
grains  in  order  to  supply  firms  operating
under  public  management  and  very  small
private  processors.
Starting  in  July  1979,  Mexico  began  a
transition  to  the  more  common  customs
valuation  practice  of duties based  on invoice
values.  Unfortunately,  many  agricultural
products  are  still  subject  to  the  old  official
valuation  system.
With the elimination  of licensing  require-
ments  for an additional 586 import items late
in  1979,  less  than  25  percent  of the  8,000
items in  the Mexican  tariff remain  subject to
import licensing.  The  Mexican  Government
has  promised  that  those  items  which  con-
tinue  to  require  import  licenses  will  be
reviewed  during  1980,  although  further
progress in liberalizing imports will undoubt-
edly  be  slow  since  most  of these  items  are
highly  sensitive  to  Mexican  industry  and
agriculture.
Licensing continues  to cause  problems  for
exporters  like  the  United  States.  A  few
months ago,  in response to a drop in Mexican
pork prices caused by large-scale  slaughter of
swine,  the  Mexican  Government  stopped
issuing  import  licenses  for  pork  meat  and
meat  products.
Although the United States is the principal
supplier  of  pork  to  Mexico,  there  was  no
notification  that  this  action  was  being  con-
sidered  or  even  that  it  had  been  imposed.
In a similar manner,  the United States was
not  notified  of  a  decision  by  the  Mexican
Government  shortly  after  the  pork  ban  to
suddenly suspend imports of hides and skins.
These  kinds  of measures  which  suddenly
and completely  close the  Mexican  market to
trade  are  extremely  disruptive  as  well  as
costly  to  the  individual  shippers  involved.
However,  of greater concern  from a bilateral
relations  standpoint  is  the  uncertainty  such
action creates  for  the future  development  of
trade.
Mexico  was  an  active  participant  in  the
recently  concluded  Tokyo  Round  of  trade
negotiations  held under auspices  of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade (GAIT).
Unfortunately,  at  the  conclusion  of  these
negotiations  Mexico  decided  for  internal
reasons not to become a GATT member. This
means  that for the present,  at least,  Mexico
remains  outside  of the  only  serious multila-
teral  forum  for  the  conduct  of international
trade.  The  advantage  of the  GAIT  is that  it
provides  an  institutional  structure  of trade
rules and a mechanism which provides  mem-
bers  with  a  chance  to  head  off trade  differ-
ences  before  they  become  trade  confronta-
tions.  The  GATT  mechanism  has  been  im-
portant  for  the  growth  and development  of
world trade.  It could be important to Mexico
as well.  Hopefully  Mexico will reexamine the
issue of GAIT  membership  at an  early date.
Problems  on  the  U.S.  Side
Not all of the trade problems between  our
two countries result from actions taken south
of the  border.
In the United  States, there is not universal
enthusiasm  about  the  prospect  of  greater
imports  of Mexican  agricultural  products.
While everyone  acknowledges  that trade is
a  two-way  street,  the  U.S.  producers  who
stand  to be  hurt by  greater  competition  -
notably,  growers  of fruits  and vegetables  -
are  loathe  to  "take  it  on  the  chin"  so  that
other groups of U.S.  producers  - for exam-
ple,  growers  of corn,  soybeans,  wheat,  and
perhaps  livestock  - may  gain.
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Time  was  when  Mexico's  big agricultural
sales to the United States were coffee, cocoa,
and  bananas  - which  posed  no  threat  to
U.S.  producers  since  we  didn't  grow  these
items  ourselves.
While  U.S.  imports  of  these  traditional
items  are  still  sizable,  the  most  dramatic
increases  in  recent  years  have  been  in  im-
ports of such competitive products  as animals
and animal products and,  in particular, fruits
and  vegetables.
Within  Mexico,  the  availability  of  cheap
labor  combined  with  favorable  weather  has
historically  given  Mexico a cost advantage  in
production  of  horticultural  products.  As  a
result,  shipments  of  Mexican  horticultural
products to the United  States have increased
significantly  in  recent  years.  In  fact,  fresh
tomatoes  are  now the second largest agricul-
tural  export  from  Mexico  to  the  United
States,  accounting for $153  million last year.
Mexico's  share  of  the  $400-million-plus
U.S.  winter  vegetable  market  is  now about
half - and U.S.  producers  have been  quite
vocal about their belief that that is  quite big
enough.
The  upshot  has  been  a  long  history  of
complaints  and  countercomplaints  which
have  characterized  the  so-called  "Tomato
War"  with  Mexico.
The  "Tomato  War"  most recently came to
the  public's  attention  when  growers  from
Florida  filed  a  petition  in  September  1978
claiming  that  Mexican  growers  were  dump-
ing - that is, selling at prices below their fair
market  value  - winter  vegetables  on  the
U.S.  market.  Tomatoes  were  one  of the five
products  involved  which  also  included  egg-
plant,  green  peppers,  cucumbers,  and
squash.
On  March  24,  1980,  the  Commerce  De-
partment  made  a  final  determination  that
Mexican  produce  was  not being sold in  U.S.
markets  at less than its fair  value.  However,
because of a number  of complex legal  issues
involved,  the Florida growers have  appealed
the decision and the case is still in the courts.
Mexico's  shipments  of horticultural  prod-
ucts  to  the  United  States  are  expected  to
continue  to  grow.  And  even  though  the
inroads  into U.S.  markets  are not likely to be
as great  as in  the past  as Mexican  labor costs
rise  and  U.S.  efficiency  increases  through
new  harvesting  and production  techniques,
the pressures will remain.  If these pressures
are  to  be  managed  without  confrontation,
greater cooperation  will be required on both
sides  of the  border.
In  the  past,  Mexico  has  complained  that
U.S.  health and sanitary,  food additive,  and
pesticide  regulations  and  marketing  orders
have  also  served  as  nontariff  barriers  to
Mexican  exports  - particularly  of horticul-
tural products.  But cooperation on the part of
both  nations  has  helped  to  lessen  these
complaints  in  recent  years.
Many of the primary Mexican horticultural
exports  are  subject to marketing order regu-
lations  in  the  United  States which  establish
grade,  size,  quality,  and maturity  standards
of  imported  as  well  as  domestic  produce.
Among  the  crops  so  affected  are  tomatoes,
onions,  green peppers,  avocadoes,  mangoes,
limes,  oranges,  grapefruit,  cucumbers,  and
eggplant.
Despite  their  perceived  drawbacks,  how-
ever,  the  U.S.  marketing  orders  may  be of
some value to  Mexican producers  who bene-
fit  from  their price  stabilizing  effects.  Also,
most of the orders  are less restrictive  in the
areas  of  quality,  size,  or  grade  regulations
than  Mexico's  own  quality  controls  on  ex-
ports.
Of  recent  concern  to  Mexico  have  been
Congressional  efforts  to  include  packaged
tomatoes  in  the  import  provisions  of  the
tomato  marketing  order  so  as  to  prohibit
combining  of sizes  in packages.  So far,  these
legislative  proposals  have  not  been  suc-
cessful.
Imports  from  Mexico  of  fresh  or  frozen
beef and veal have been subject  to voluntary
restraints  made  necessary  by  the  Meat  Im-
port Law of 1964.  Although this program has
from time to time strained our bilateral trade
relations,  in  recent  years  Mexico  has  not
filled its  total allocation  because  of domestic
shortages of meat. The U. S. law was changed
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in  1979 to  a counter-cyclical  import program
which  permits  larger  imports  when  U.S.
domestic  production  is  down.  This provides
some obvious  benefits to suppliers  like Mex-
ico  in  tight-supply,  high-price  years.  It re-
mains  to be  seen whether  this new  law will
markedly  affect  Mexico's  access in periods  of
domestic  surplus.
Greater  Cooperation  Needed
The growing interdependence  of U.S.  and
Mexican  agriculture makes improved cooper-
ation  between  our  two  countries  essential.
However,  it is easier  to  talk  about coopera-
tion  than  it  is  to  achieve  it.
Cooperation  requires  hard  work.  It  re-
quires good information on both sides - and
the willingness to share it. It requires moder-
ation  and  at  times  compromise  in  order  to
avoid  adoption  of  extreme  and  rigid  posi-
tions.
The kind  of trading  environment  that has
often  prevailed  in the past between  our two
countries  - where  each  country  operates
independently,  entirely in its own interest -
has a certain  appeal to many  on both sides of
the border who prefer suspicion and confron-
tation  to  cooperation.  In  fact,  moderation
may  be  more  difficult  to  explain  to our two
constituencies  than a more extreme position.
The  signing  of  the  supply/purchase
agreement  in  January  was  a very  significant
step  in  the  direction  of improved  coopera-
tion.  We  need  to  follow  it  up  with  more.
There are a number of areas where our two
countries  could  benefit:
- A  consultative  mechanism  should  be
developed  and  utilized  to  deal  with  trade
problems,  particularly  affecting trade in win-
ter fruits  and  vegetables.
- Innovative direct solutions to structural
problems  should be  explored.  For example,
one possible  solution  to the  meat  deficit  in
Mexico,  which would  also  alleviate  the cur-
rent  pressure  on  the  grain  transportation
system,  would  be  the  feeding  of  Mexican
cattle  on  a  contract  basis  in  U.S.  feedlots
along the  border.  Grain  shipped  to the  U.S.
side  of the border would  not tax the already
overburdened  Mexican  railway  system.  The
fed cattle  or the processed  meat,  if Mexican
slaughter facilities  are limited,  could be ship-
ped  back  to  Mexico  to  help  overcome  its
meat  deficit.
- A  cooperative  effort  is  already  under-
way  to  seek  solutions  to  transportation  bot-
tlenecks.  Meetings  involving  high-level offi-
cials have been held on how to streamline the
inspection  process  so  trains  can  move  back
and  forth  across  the  border  with  minimal
delays.  Agreements  have  also  been  reached
for  use  of  unit  trains  to  help  with  border
congestion.
- There  are  ample  areas  for  cooperation
in  scientific  research  and  technical  assist-
ance.  In  the  past  year,  Mexico  and  the
United  States  agreed  on  an extensive  scien-
tific  research  and  exchange  program  under
which  the  two countries  are  developing  ex-
changes  on  the  production  of livestock  and
conventional  crops,  screening  of new crops,
and  agricultural  education  and  training.
Some 40 projects have been developed in the
areas  of arid land  forage,  animal  production
and  health,  and  plant  production.  Another
area is  remote  sensing where  U.S.  technolo-
gy  could  be  extremely  useful  to  Mexican
planners  in  improving crop estimating  tech-
niques.
One  of the actions  we're  taking  to better
explore  these  areas  of  cooperation  is  the
establishment  of  a  U.S.-Mexican  working
group  on  agriculture.  Discussions  on  the
agenda for this group are in the initial stages.
However,  there  is  no reason  why the  group
cannot undertake  a broad view of its mandate
and  look into  ways  we  can  work together  to
our  mutual  interests.
Conclusion
Mexico's population  and per capita incom-
es  are  on  the  rise.  To  meet  the  country's
demand  for  food  and  feed,  increased  trade
between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  is
inevitable,  even  if  the  SAM  achieves  the
success  that  Mexico's  planners  hope.
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The  supply/purchase  agreement  between
Mexico  and the  United  States  marks  a turn-
ing  point  in  our  bilateral  relations  in  the
direction  of  greater  cooperation  and  inter-
dependence.  The  Agricultural  Working
Group will provide a mechanism for develop-
ment of bilateral cooperation  in  a number of
areas  of  mutual  interest  and  benefits.  It's
time  to  get  to  work.
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